Introduction
The current economic crisis is characterized by a severe contraction of credit. Although reliable statistics are scarce, several observers note that this contraction also appears to have hit the trade nance sector hard (Auboin, 2009) 
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Our main argument in favor of trade nance targeting in times of a nancial crisis is that rms are then likely to have an incentive to hoard cash. When hoarding occurs, funding for inter-rm transactions has greater social value than other funding, because trade nance cannot be hoarded by borrowers. Thus, the reasons for promoting trade nance are stronger than for promoting credit in general.
While these arguments pertain both to domestic and international trade nance, we argue that they are stronger in the international context. Because international loan enforcement is weaker than domestic enforcement, sellers are less willing to keep international loans on their books, and it is the seller's insistence on immediate payment that creates the demand for liquidity in the rst place.
The crisis also means that uncertainty has increased, probably magnifying problems of asymmetric information in the credit market. We discuss the e ects that asymmetric information about nancial constraints can have on inter-rm trade.
While we nd that such nancial uncertainty is harmful, our conclusion is that general nancial easing may be as e ective as speci c easing of trade nance for dealing with this problem.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections provide some brief de nitions and some background. Section 2 focuses on the details of trade nance, whereas Section 3 gives a brief overview of the role of nancial frictions in international trade. Section 4 outlines our main argument for trade nance support. A formal model buttressing our argument is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 discusses, in a similarly formal way, some of the issues that our basic model neglects. The
Sections 5-7 may thus be skipped by readers without an interest in checking the ne details of our arguments.
Definitions and basic theory
A broad de nition of trade nance is any nancial arrangements connected to interrm commercial transactions. By this de nition, extension of ordinary trade credit
is an example of trade nance. A narrow de nition of trade nance is the funding of individual international commercial transactions by nancial intermediaries.
Even the broadly de ned trade nance phenomenon is puzzling at rst glance.
Why do rms that are not specializing in nancial intermediation extend credit to other rms? A common explanation for this is that rms in a business relationship aquire information about each other that it would be expensive (or even impossible)
for banks to obtain. While plausible, the basic monitoring story does not explain why trade nance is almost exclusively provided in-kind; if the monitoring advantage is so great, who don't rms also lend cash to each other?
One explanation for this pattern is that rms with access to funding for the purchase of illiquid assets are less tempted to engage in activities that are undesirable from the investors' point of view, as discussed by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) . Since in-kind credit is expensive to divert to other usages, potential moral hazard problems on the borrower's side are reduced when trade credit is extended. This has the important implication that trade credit and other types of credit are complements rather than substitutes, a prediction that is supported by evidence in Giannetti et al
Such complementarities suggest that alternative sources of funding cannot ll the gap when trade credit dries up. Instead, reduced trade credit will worsen the access to other types of credit as well. While this would seem to be a general argument in favor of targeting trade nance over other types of interventions, such a conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn. The reason is that the value of this additional bank credit in principle could be extracted by the seller who provides the trade credit. Thus, it is not clear that the trade credit multiplier e ect justi es speci c trade credit subsidies.
Rather, it is an argument for relaxing the sellers' access to nance by improving the workings of the nancial sector in general.
The narrow de nition of trade nance restricts attention to international transactions that are directly funded by intermediaries. Of course, not all international
transactions are intermediated; sometimes the seller keeps the receivable on the own books as is common for domestic trade credit. However, the more signi cant role of intermediaries in international trade is interesting, because it informs us that there could be greater obstacles to the extension of international trade credit. Our interpretation is that sellers are more worried about strategic default in the case of foreign buyers. Thus, sellers tend to insist on upfront payment from foreigners. 2 Since the foreign buyer frequently needs the credit, the natural arrangement is to borrow from a bank in the own country. That bank in turn, for the reasons discussed above, is more willing to provide speci c loans for input purchases than to provide general cash loans. Hence, one natural arrangement is for the buyer's bank to verify the shipment, and pay upon delivery to the seller's bank, while providing a loan to the buyer.
According to our analysis, the need for immediate payments due to fears of strategic default is the deep reason why trade nance is so vulnerable to liquidity crises.
The importance of strategic default fears is demonstrated by the numerous studies documenting that international contract enforment is a serious concern for rms involved in international trade (Rauch, 2001 ). 3 Similarly, cross-border trust has also been shown to be an important determinant of international trade and investment (Guiso et al, 2008 ).
2 Numerous studies document that international contract enforment is a serious concern for rms involved in international trade (Rauch, 2001 ) Indeed, much of the recent theoretical work on international trade is built on the assumption of imperfect contract enforcement (Antr as and RossiHansberg, 2009). Cross-border trust has also been shown to be an important determinant of international economic activity (Guiso et al, 2008 The above discussion highlights the important linkages between nance and trade in general, but does not say much that speci cally concerns trade nance. While it is likely that trade nance has been particularly badly hit by the current crisis, problems in the general nancial system are the root cause for this. At rst sight, it is therefore far from obvious that targeting trade nance is the best response. In the next sections, we will provide arguments for giving priority to trade nance programs rather than more general programs aimed at easing credit conditions. In this section, we provide the building blocks for our arguments. nance program is the insight that it is more di cult to make credible pledges across borders than within borders (e.g. Rodrik, 2000) .
When a nancial crisis turns into a recession, as now, interventions in nancial markets have two bene cial e ects. The rst direct e ect is the value of additional funds to the nancially constrained rms themselves. The second indirect e ect is the value to the constrained rms' trading partners of the additional activity in the constrained rm. For example, when the constrained rm increases its production it needs more inputs, and input suppliers' pro t goes up. Our view is that policies to deal with the current crisis ought to focus on the indirect e ect rather than the direct e ect. There are two reasons. First, the indirect e ects are large during a crisis due to excess capacity. Second, an increase of general credit provision may not lead to an immediate expansion of production at all, because borrowers are so afraid of being A nal building block of our argument is that prices are downwardly rigid in the short term. For some reason, sellers cannot or will not immediately reduce their prices despite a high premium on liquidity. The price rigidity could, for example, be due to reputational concerns or because of long-term contracting clauses, either between the seller and the buyer (e.g., a long term agreement about price) or between the seller and other buyers (e.g., a most favored customer clause).
We do not assume that prices are stuck at a level that the buyer is unwilling to pay, but only that they are so high that the buyer is unwilling pay cash immediately, in view of the high opportunity cost of liquidity. Because of limited pledgeability,
the seller on the other hand is unwilling to extend the necessary credit. Also, the opportunity cost of liquidity implies that a general loan to either party will be hoarded rather than spent on the transaction, because the buyer does not internalize the seller's bene t when deciding whether to trade. However, and this is the main point, targeted trade nance loans cannot be used for another purpose, and will thus be used to fund the transaction. The problem is most severe when there is less trust across borders than within them. Then, there is less trust between the two banks than between the buyer and the buyer's bank. In this case, the inability to pledge future returns is transfered from the buyer to the buyer's bank. In normal times, trade credit will typically be left on the books of the buyer's bank { with the seller's bank being paid o at the transaction date. Since nobody wants to make transaction date payments when liquidity is scarce, we are essentially back to the original problem facing the two rms. (With complete cross-border trust between banks, the seller can hold a claim on the domestic bank, the domestic bank can hold a claim of the foreign bank, and the foreign bank can hold a claim on the buyer, and all the claims can last until the buyer obtains cash.)
To the extent that sellers and buyers are located in the same country, there is reason to expect domestic support for trade credit funding. However, when they are located in separate countries, the most appropriate intervention is to provide selective funds to the buyer's bank, whereas the bene ts to a large extent ow to the seller's country. This, then, is an argument for international policy coordination.
An empirical implication of our argument is that imports in countries where there is less trust in the buyer's bank will be hit relatively hard by the nancial crisis.
According to IMF (2009), imports to LDCs are expected to decline more than exports from these countries, while the reverse is expected among advanced economies.
Assuming that there is less trust in the LDCs banks (partly due to less credible government guarantees), this is in line with our model's predictions. Needless to say, this is not a formal test of the model and the pattern could be due to other factors, but at least the pattern is broadly consistent with our story.
The next section articulates our argument formally. Thereafter we discuss two other models that capture dimensions that the rst model neglects.
Price rigidity and trade finance
Here is a simple model that clari es the logic of our main argument. A seller has a resource that a buyer may purchase and re ne. Re ning takes two periods. For simplicity, we assume that the process is costless. It increases the value of the resource from c to v. Traditionally, the seller and the buyer have been trading at a price p = (c + v)=2 that splits the gains from trade equally. For reasons alluded to above (and further expanded upon in the next section), we suppose that this price is rigid in the short run.
However, due to an imminent liquidity shock, both the seller and the buyer faces a one-period return to holding cash of r. That is, from the date 0 perspective, the two parties know that they can trade to generate a surplus at date 2 of v c, but also that any cash held at the beginning of period 0 earns an expected return r if So far, we have only considered spot payments at date 0. What if the buyer could credibly promise to pay at date 2? In this case, the problem evaporates, since both parties are willing to trade at p as long as they do not have to forgo the date 1 return on liquidity. 5 In other words, the buyer's inability to credibly pledge future payments to the seller is at the heart of the problem. For simplicity, let us assume that the buyer is unable to make any credible long-term promises about future payments to the seller.
Observe that this problem cannot be resolved by just extending more credit to the buyer, since these funds are more pro tably invested to earn the liquidity return r than by paying p at date 0. However, here comes our main point: Extending speci c trade nance to the buyer does work, as long as the rate of interest is smaller than (v p)=p. Since such funds have no alternative use, they will be used to facilitate transactions. Of course, liquidity is increased by the same amount as a general credit facility, but the liquidity bene ts now accrue to the seller rather than to the buyer.
Thus, funding of trade credit generates bene ts over and above those generated by general credit facilities. 5 Large buyers in industrialized countries sometimes unilaterally initiate delayed payments to domestic suppliers. In terms of our model, this is a rational response to liquidity shocks as long as the pledge to pay later is credible.
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As indicated above the presence of banks does not make a substantial di erence to the argument. In normal times, outstanding credit will typically be left on the books of the buyer's bank { with the seller's bank being paid o at date 0. Since the date 0 payments are infeasible when liquidity is scarce, we are essentially back to the original problem facing the two rms, at least as long as there is insu cient trust between the two banks.
Clearly, a general increase of credit to the buyer's bank will not solve the problem, because the buyer's bank will prefer to earn the liquidity return r over any interest rate that can be economically o ered in return for a date 0 payment. However, if instead the buyer's bank is o ered a selective facility for trade credit extension, then it will utilize it as long as it earns a positive return, even if that return is below r.
Thus, the argument in favor of trade credit is the same whether banks are involved or not.
Durable goods and endogenous deflation
Our argument above rested on two key assumptions: rigid prices and nancial frictions. One feature of the crisis is the fear of falling prices, especially in durable goods markets. What is the relationship between nancial frictions and price de ation? Is there a straightforward channel from nancial frictions to temporary downward price rigidity?
To study this question, let us consider the following scenario, adapted from Stokey (1979). 6 A seller produces a durable good. For simplicity, suppose that production costs are zero and that the good is in nitely lived. Let time be discrete, and let buyers value the good at v per period. Due to impatience as well as nancial constraints, buyers discount future utility at a rate r per period. Let = 1=(1 + r) denote the 6 Stokey's main point is actually that intertemporal price discrimination does not occur when buyers have identical discount factors. Our point is that with di erent discount factors it occurs under reasonable additional assumptions.
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If all buyers are identical, the optimal pricing strategy is for the seller is to extract all the buyers' surplus by setting the price
Suppose now that the shock to the nancial sector hits buyers di erently. One group of buyers gets hit hard, and now faces an interest rate r H . The other group gets hit less, and faces the interest rate r L < r H . Let L and H denote the corresponding discount factors. Ideally, the seller would now want to set di erent prices for the two types o buyer. However, such \third-degree" price discrimination may be impossible either due to arbitrage or because the seller cannot observe buyers' nancial constraints. In order to extract as much surplus as possible, the seller may therefore engage in intertemporal price discrimination instead.
Rather than deriving the optimal intertemporal price discrimination scheme, let us illustrate the argument by considering the strategy to sell immediately to type L and wait one period to sell to type H. Obviously, if type L has bought already, the optimal price next period is
In order to induce type L to buy immediately instead of waiting, the initial price must give at least as high utility. That is,
Let p L denote the largest p L that is consistent with the above condition:
Let h be the fraction of type H buyer types and let denote the seller's discount factor. The pro t associated with intertemporal price discrimination can then be
Without intertemporal price discrimination, the seller can in principle choose between two options: (i) Only sell to type L at a price v=(1 L ): (ii) Sell to both types at price v=(1 H ): Note that the rst option relies on the problematic assumption that the seller can credibly commit not to reduce the price in the next period. Comparing intertemporal price discrimination to the uniform price strategy (option (ii)), it is straightforward to check that price discrimination is preferable if
At rst sight, it appears that intertemporal price discrimination is more likely to be pro table when is large. However, if L ; it would pay for the seller to lend to the most constrained buyers. On the other hand, if H ; such a nancial transaction is unpro table. Thus, the likelihood of intertemporal price discrimination is highest when the seller is neither so unconstrained as to o er trade credit to fund immediate purchase by all buyers nor so constrained as to prefer all revenues immediately to larger revenues gradually.
Under intertemporal price discrimination, the winners from the nancial shock are the buyers that are hit less hard; they now pay less than their reservation value.
The relatively better nancial position is turned into a net gain. The other buyer group is indi erent, whereas the seller loses.
It is worth noting that the durable goods model is able to produce a prolonged period of price de ation even if there is no exogenously imposed price rigidity. Moreover, if funds are being made available at interest rate r L speci cally for the purchases of durable goods, price de ation would end and purchases would be made immediately.
Perishable goods
Even without de ation, nancial constraints can entail ine cient trade if there is asymmetric information about trading partners' nancial conditions. However, in this case it is less obvious that a general subsidy of trade credit is the optimal solution.
To clarify our arguments, let us consider a modi cation of the above model. Suppose now that a buyer's opportunity cost of funds is r b . The maximum amount that a type i buyer is willing to pay is thus
Suppose that the seller cannot observe a buyer's borrowing cost, thinking it to be uniformly distributed on some interval [r l ; r h ]:That is, the distribution function is g(r) = 1=(r h r l ) for all r in this interval and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, a buyer's willingness to pay for the seller's product, call it , is uniformly distributed on the interval [
in this interval and 0 otherwise. The corresponding cumulative distribution function is
Since a buyer purchases at price p if and only if > p; the demand facing the seller is simply the probability that > p; which is 1 F (p):
If the uncertainty is su ciently small, it is optimal for the seller to set the largest price that induces trade with probability 1, namely the price
However, as the uncertainty increases, it is eventually optimal to set a price which a buyer will reject if the opportunity cost of funds is su ciently large. To be precise, the seller chooses the price to maximize expected pro t = (p c)(1 F (p));
and the unique interior solution to this problem is
In this case, a buyer refuses to trade with positive probability. The absence of trade is ine cient whenever v 1+r b > c. As an illustration of the argument, consider the example c = 1; v = 1:2; r l = 0:01: To begin with, suppose for simplicity that there is no uncertainty, so r h = r l : We imagine that the period length is a month, so the corresponding yearly interest rate is about 12:7%. Even in periods with single digit market interest rates, this is a reasonable number for a rm that cannot borrow unlimited amounts in the banks or in commercial bond markets. With small uncertainty, the price is p 1 = 1:2=1:01, yielding a mark-up slightly below 20%. Letting the opportunity cost of funds and uncertainty grow by increasing r h , the price, p 1 , starts to drop, until it reaches the level when it is no longer optimal to sell with probability 1, which happens at the point where p 2 = v 1+r h ; which in the example is when r h 0:097 b r: As nancial constraints tighten further, the price stays at p 2 = 1:094 1. Thus, the mark-up stays at about half the original level, and any increase in uncertainty simply reduces the probability of trade, as a buyer with r b > r h is not willing to pay the price.
Suppose now that each buyer is granted trade nance by some government body at a rate r p , smaller than or equal to b r. Then, it is optimal for the seller to set the
, at which all buyers will make a purchase. Note that all the gains from the additional trade in this case go to the seller. Indeed, if the trade credit interest rate is reduced below b r, the buyer can only lose, because the seller's price is increased correspondingly. The reason is that the seller has to give some surplus (information rents) to the buyer when there is uncertainty concerning the buyer's interest rate.
But before endorsing trade nance subsidies on the basis of asymmetric information, it is necessary to ask why the seller would be unwilling to provide funding.
7
Suppose for concreteness that the seller can borrow a fraction ' of the value of the receivables at interest rate r 1 , and that the remainder would have to be funded internally, at the opportunity cost r 2 . 8 One possibility is that r 2 is just too large for the seller to want to extend trade credit. If so, the current model (like the model in the previous section) suggests that the problem is alleviated by relaxing the seller's nancial constraint. Alleviating it through trade nance subsidies is then only justi ed if the government believes that provision of general loans is likely to attract borrowers whose projects are less socially desirable than those borrowers who need to fund trade credit extension.
Another possibility is that ' has dropped, in which case the optimal intervention depends on the causes of the drop. If it is due to the general credit crunch, the answer is to recapitalize intermediaries, not to target trade credit.
Spillovers from trade and FDI
Altogether, we think that the incomplete information model helps to explain why uncertainty about trading partners' nancial conditions can create ine ciencies in the non-nancial sector, and not only in the nancial sector. Our point here echoes Blanchard and Kremer (1997) . In the context of the reorganization of production in transition countries, they note that transition creates asymmetric information about valuations. Blanchard and Kremer also observe that such uncertainty about trading 7 We shall not here discuss in detail the features of an optimal trade credit contract in case the seller can raise the necessary funds; for a seminal analysis of this issue see Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988). 8 It is well known that ' tends to be well below 1 even in normal times. A likely explanation is that intermediaries fear that rms try to borrow against fake invoices.
partners' valuations is particularly detrimental in long supply chains. The vertical separation of production that we have seen in recent years (e.g. Helpman, 2006) therefore magni es the ine ciencies that we have discussed here.
There is substantial evidence showing that being part of an international supply chain, either as an exporter or an a local supplier to MNCs, generates positive productivity e ects, in particular among producers in LDCs. 9 Breaking up such supply chains because of short-term credit constraints can therefore have severe longterm negative repurcussions. Again, the value generated in the supply chain can in principle be extracted by extending trade credit among trading partners. If trading partners are credit constratined, the best course of action is to relax those constraints by measures aimed directly at the nancial system in general. This argument has to be quali ed, however.
First of all, the literature suggests that not only rms within the supply chain bene t from international integration. By generating spillovers in the form of technologies and know-how it also improves the productivity of rms outside the supply chain. The value of such spillovers cannot be captured by rms extending trade credit and it is thus a general argument in favor of government interventions in the trade nance sector.
Second, there is a question how long it will take for policies aimed at the general nancial system to have an e ect. Time is of importance as valuable knowledge and connections are lost permanently when rms in an international supply chain go out of business. Trade nance interventions have the advantage of being easily implementable and of working more or less directly.
Third, rms that are part of international supply chains are in general the most productive ones. Targeting trade nance is therefore a way to target rms with the best long-term opportunities, with a minimum of bureucratic involvement. 
Conclusions
To summarize, sponsoring trade nance is desirable during a liquidity squeeze primarily because the extension of credit is tied to actual current transactions. Thus, the additional credit cannot be hoarded. In the above discussion we show that these problems are particularly severe in international transactions as it is more di cult to make credible pledges across borders than within borders.
A second reason why multilateral organizations ought to support trade nance speci cally, rather than providing funding more broadly, is that domestic policy initiatives are likely to place a relatively low weight on foreigners' gains (see Economist, 2009 ). Since the support of trade nance typically involves supplying funds to the buyer's bank, while primarily bene ting the seller, it is easy to see how these transactions will su er under purely domestic policies.
Sponsoring trade nance may also in general help to alleviate insu cient trade due to incomplete information among non-nancial rms, but we think that unless there is a liquidity squeeze trade nance subsidies have no obvious advantage over general nancial measures.
